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Abstract:	  The	  article	  discusses	  the	  normative	  integration	  of	  the	  world	  society	  by	  the	  case	  of	  international	  legal	  discourses	  on	  intervention	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  century.	  Within	  the	   framework	   of	   a	   non-­‐interventionist	   international	   legal	   structure,	   international	   rights	  and	   obligations	   to	   intervene	   form	   an	   unlikely	   case	   which	   helps	   to	   reveal	   unexpected	  degrees	   of	   normative	   integration	   on	   the	   international	   level.	   The	   article	   combines	  sociological	  world	   society	   research	  with	   insights	   from	   international	   relations	   theory	   and	  comparative	   constitutionalism.	   The	   article	   discusses	   three	   interconnected	   steps	   of	  integration:	  the	  emergence	  of	  semantics	  of	  international	  community,	  its	  legal	  enforcement	  and	   justification.	   The	   analysis	   shows	   a	   legalization	   of	   international	   politics	   with	  constitutional	   characteristics.	   In	   addition	   to	   that,	   the	   results	   contribute	   to	   the	   growing	  literature	   on	   the	   history	   of	   international	   (humanitarian)	   intervention	   and	   have	   the	  potential	  of	  diachronic	  comparison	  with	  current	  intervention	  situations.	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Introduction 
The sociolegal research on “Law and Globalization” has two general strands of interest. The 
legal debate is dominated by studies on the consequences of novel national, transnational and 
international actor constellations and the legal challenges that follow from this (Schiff Berman, 
2005; Sieber, 2010). The sociological literature instead investigates primarily the global 
diffusion of norms, the puzzle of global-local legal interactions and the emergence of global 
legal institutions (Boyle and Meyer, 1998; Halliday and Carruthers, 2007; Halliday and Osinsky, 
2006; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). 
In this article I address the foundations of the latter literature. Underlying the problem of 
global-local legal interrelations and the emergence of global legal institutions is the question of 
the shared normative consciousness of legal actors on the world societal level. The article builds 
on the sociological tradition which assigns the concept of society from the local on the global 
scale and considers “the world as a whole as the primordial unit of analysis” (Bergesen 1980). 
Taking this as a vantage point I study the foundations of the legal integration of this world 
society. 
The paper investigates the consciousness of global normative integration using the 
international legal theory on the question of intervention in the late 19th and early 20th century as 
primary data source. These discourses are relevant in the context of international normative 
integration since they constitute a most unlikely case. Given the predominant normative 
framework of national independent sovereignty and non-intervention in the 19th century, the 
article highlights the semantics of international community and elaborates how rights and 
obligations of intervention were built, enforced and justified on these grounds. 
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Doing this, the descriptive parts contribute to the growing literature on the history of 
international interventions; a literature that is strikingly narrowed to the issue of “Humanitarian 
Intervention” (Barnett, 2011; Knudsen, 2009; Trim and Simms, 2011). These perspectives are 
narrowed because the legal theory of international intervention in the 19th century is too complex 
to discuss the subcategory of humanitarian intervention independently. Furthermore, not only 
historical sources but also recent debates show that the issue of intervention is not limited to the 
humanitarian sphere but is also important in light of economic and financial relations as in the 
recent European debt crisis. This potential for diachronic comparison makes the analysis of 19th 
century intervention law relevant for the overarching question of global normative consciousness 
as well as for current debates on the legal conceptualization of interventions (see also Glanville, 
2011). 
The theoretical puzzle consists in the analysis of the construction of a legal “global 
consciousness” (Robertson) and the study of how the idea of community was used as a 
precondition for the establishment of international norms to interfere. A central aim of this article 
is to carve out “semantics” that urge the community and by this advance the “genesis” of a world 
society.  Rudolf Stichweh argued that the genesis of the world society consists of both a 
structural integration on the world societal level – trade, division of labor, etc. – and normative 
expectations in regard to the emergence of integration of the common humanity – semantics of 
“ius gentium”, „communitas humani generis“, or “Weltbürgerrecht” (Stichweh, 2004). This 
article elaborates the latter, the semantics of community building in the international legal theory 
of intervention in the 19th and 20th century, how they were enacted and protected. 
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I will refer to classical sociological concepts of community (Durkheim, Parsons, etc.) to 
argue that the idea of community is the basis of a process of social integration on the 
international legal level. This turn to classical sociology theory is justified by two aspects. 
Firstly, since the essential elements of the debate I intend to unfold in this paper lie in these 
classical writings; and secondly, for in this literature concepts of community and integration 
were developed which are used in neighbour disciplines in a similar manner. Thus, the 
introduction of these, in the end, interdisciplinary rather than purely sociological concepts opens 
the study and its result for a broader academic audience. 
The focus is on the construction of global consciousness in legal theory. Thus, the article is 
based on a qualitative analysis of legal discourses. The study is not limited to textual 
interpretations alone but analyzes “utterances” with regard to their intended meaning which is 
embedded in the particular historical contexts (Skinner, 2002: 86-89). In this sense, the study 
stands methodologically in the tradition of “conceptual history”. A central issue that provoked an 
approach of conceptual history in the 1970s was the puzzle of the interrelation of “experience” 
and “expectation” in the constitution of history. A related assumption stands at the outset of this 
study, which is the interrelation of linguistics and social change (Koselleck, 1979). In more 
concrete terms, the analysis in this article studies texts and their intended meanings to learn about 
the emergence and developments of social changes. The primary aim is not to gather data which 
is representative in an empirical sense but rather to carve out argumentative patterns which 
explain social changes that may be further tested in more comprehensive research settings in the 
future. 
The article uses semantic data to learn about the emergence of shared normative values in the 
world society. The discussion shows that the international law of intervention was based on a 
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consciousness of collectivity of the “international community”; an idea that was introduced as a 
legal principle in the mid of the 19th century. Building on this idea, individual and collective 
action was legitimized to protect the security of the community and international legal principles. 
Within this frame interventions were justified by their motivations (humanitarian, political, 
economical) but also by its success. In particular the latter suggests to be interpreted as a 
legalization of international power with constitutional characteristics. 
Altogether the article contributes to the debate on the normative integration of the world 
society by using unaccounted historical data and interlinking the analysis to adjacent debates in 
transnational legal theory. Out of the historical data I discuss three interrelated steps of 
integration: the use of semantics of the international community, its legal enforcement and 
justification. As I will show, in the sociological literature it is a subject of controversy whether 
social integration is a normative or a functionalist development.  
The general argumentative steps, the article presents, can be summarized as follows: Based 
on the idea of community, international laws that allow intervention into the sphere of an 
independent sovereign international entity are formulated in international legal texts. Effective 
enforcement institutions then lift the idea of community beyond the semantic stage. Eventually, 
justifications are important in the analysis of interventions not only because they reveal the set of 
shared values behind intervention rights (Finnemore, 1996; Knudsen 2009: 33) but also as a legal 
category which legitimates the exercising of political power by its motivation and its success. 
This legalization of power carries constitutional characteristics which in turn furthers the process 
of international normative integration. 
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The article is organized in three sections. The first section sets out the problem of 
intervention in regard to the fundamental conflict of international order between “national 
independence” and “international solidarity”. In the second section, on the consciousness of 
collectivity, I discuss how the idea of international community was used in international legal 
doctrines to justify the interference in national independence and by this advanced the normative 
integration of the world society. The third section turns to the question of how these doctrines 
were put into practice and focuses on the enforcement and justification of international 
intervention laws. It becomes clear, that the international law of intervention went beyond the 
semantic stage and rather emerged as an enforceable set of legal doctrines with constitutional 
characteristics. The concluding section summarizes the main theoretical contribution and set out 
perspectives for future research. 
Integration, community and the problem of intervention 
In this section I develop the main problem of intervention, the tension between the legal 
independence of nation states and their integration into the international legal system. I do this in 
light of sociological concepts of integration and community, originally rendered by Durkheim 
and Parsons. 
As already mentioned the decision to go back to classical sociological readings is meant to 
introduce and open the analysis for a more interdisciplinary audience, rather than the specified 
community of sociological readers. The study of shared norms and values does not only shape 
the discussion about the world society until today but is also the angle to connect the results to 
the neighbor fields in political science and legal studies which develop and use these heuristics in 
a similar sense. 
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The notion of integration is a key term in writings on global law. Integration generally 
describes the participation of an individual, an organization, or a state in trans- or international 
legal regimes. Though integration is usually conceived as a self evident concept in this context, 
different usages appear in the legal and sociological literature. The most fundamental 
discrepancy seems to be that whereas in the legal literature a tradition exist which uses the term 
of integration to describe an outcome – possibly going back to Rudolph Smend’s 
Integrationslehre (Smend, 1928) – sociological authors emphasize integration as a process which 
leads to the formation of society. It is this role of integration in the process of society formation 
which is important in the context of this article. 
The social integration of societies is the fundamental subject of sociology. The controversies 
about the dynamics which drive processes of social integration – solidarity (Durkheim), conflict 
(Simmel, later Dahrendorf), shared norms and values (Parsons), functional differentiation 
(Luhmann) etc. – are as old as the discipline itself. This is true also for the different levels of 
integration – Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Tonnies), social integration and systems integration 
(Lockwood) – which have to be addressed in an adequate treatment of the issue. In this section I 
will take from these debates what is essential to motivate the research question of this paper and 
do not mean to cover the field as a whole. 
Generally, the following analysis of social integration has to deal with solidarity and conflict. 
Solidarity has to be addressed because any right or obligation of intervention is based on the idea 
of an international community, on the consciousness of common collective interests of 
international legal actors. The dimension of conflict is pertinent, since the international law of 
intervention in the end is an instrument (or institution) to order international dispute and 
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violence. Thus, both solidarity and conflict are considered decisive factors in the emergence of 
social integration. This corresponds also with David Lockwood’s model of different levels of 
integration, which emphasizes that both the “social integration” of the actors of a social system 
and the “system integration” between the parts of a social system have to be addressed to get an 
adequate perspective on social change (Lockwood, 1964: 244- 245). 
With regard to solidarity as a driving factor of social integration I shall refer first of all to 
Emile Durkheim (see overview by Turner, 1981). In his “The division of labour in society” 
Durkheim states that it is “internal solidarity” that “causes the unity of organised societies” 
(Durkheim 1893/1984: 297). As a central notion to explain the internal solidarity of a society 
throughout the book he uses the term of “collective consciousness” which is defined as “[t]he 
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society [that] forms a 
determinate system with a life of its own” (Durkheim, 1893/1984: 38-39). In this regard, the 
empirical parts of the article show that with view on international integration a central aspect of 
“collective consciousness” is first of all the awareness of international actors of shared needs and 
interests: In other words international actors are characterized by a consciousness of collectivity. 
Based on this, “laws” and “morals” emerge, the “essential function” of which “, [...], is to be 
the integrating element in a whole”, and which, in consequence “remove from the individual 
some of his freedom of movement” (Durkheim, 1893/1984: 331). In other words, individuals (or 
in our context states) which are generally characterized by egoistic motivations on the one hand, 
on the other hand do care for the existence of collective interests and needs and therefore have an 
incentive to form a society and sacrifice part of their independence (or sovereignty) as individual 
(states). 
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However, this bears a paradox that Durkheim rendered in the following way and which is a 
characteristic condition of international interventions as well:  
 
 “The question that has been the starting point for our study has been that of the connection 
between the individual personality and social solidarity. How does it come about that the 
individual, whilst becoming more autonomous, depends ever more closely upon society? How 
can he become at the same time more of an individual and yet more linked to society? For it is 
indisputable that these two movements, however contradictory they appear to be, are carried on 
in tandem. Such is the nature of the problem that we have set ourselves.”(Durkheim, 1984: 
XXX) 
 
Directly referring to Durkheim and his analysis of “solidarity”, Talcott Parsons developed his 
concept of a “Societal Community” which is fundamentally based on a “mutual identification as 
common members of a social collectivity”. Similar to Durkheim, Parsons identified solidarity “as 
the central feature of the state of integration of a social system”. One factor of this solidarity is a 
“bindingness” of collective (political) decisions. The acceptance of bindingness, thus, is part of 
the integrative process and creates in this course also obligations (Parsons, 2007: 56-58). 
Elsewhere, Parsons concluded generally that “the boundaries of a society tend to coincide with 
territorial jurisdiction of the highest-order units of political organization” (Parsons, 1961: 46). I 
will show below, that this indeed lead Parsons to the conclusion that the international system is 
not a world society, for he considered these conditions as not fulfilled on the international level. 
However, it is one task of this paper to question this and to investigate were to draw societal 
boundaries with regard to the international law of intervention. 
I now move on to the problem of intervention. In heuristic analogy to the paradox between 
individualisation and solidarity coined by Durkheim above, the underlying dilemma of any case 
of international intervention is the tension between the legal independence of nation states and 
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their integration into the international legal system. At the same time this is the fundamental 
issue of international order in general. Legal historians refer in this regard to Gustave Rolin-
Jaequemyns, one of the founding members of the Institut de droit international, who in 1876 
remarked that the issue of intervention is of greatest importance for the study of international 
law, since it directly addresses the polarity of national independence and international solidarity 
(Rolin-Jaequemyns, 1876: 676; Vec, 2010: 141). 
National independence is the expression of the principle of sovereignty – a principle which is 
considered to be the fundamental basis of the international legal system since the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648. Even though the empirical importance of sovereignty is qualified from 
different disciplinary perspectives (Krasner, 1999: 24; Trim, 2011), it still is the standard 
narrative in studies on the intellectual history of international law and international relations 
(Philpott, 2001). I show in the following that the role of the principle of sovereignty is to be 
questioned not only in practical but also in conceptual terms. By mid of the 19th century ideas of 
international community emerged as legal concepts. As yet, these concepts have received 
relatively little scholarly attention in the debate on the emergence of international community 
(exceptions are Koskenniemi, 2001: 32; Vec, 2006: 48–74).  
The following sections describe how the abstract idea of international community was 
transformed into legal doctrines and legal practices respectively. From the beginning, the 
international community was more than just a normative goal. The concepts of international 
community were regarded as a “philosophy of international law” from the perspective of 19th 
century actors. This philosophy aimed at laying the foundations of the legal system 
independently from applicable law (Vec, 2006: 52) these concepts were actually presented as 
international laws. 
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The consciousness of collectivity 
      The basis of the international law of intervention is the idea of an international community of 
states. The analysis of legal discourses in this section shows that this consciousness of 
collectivity is the key heuristic for the establishment and the justification of intervention norms. 
The right to interfere, as part of a legal system that is based on the fundamental principle of 
sovereignty, does not work without a sense of collectivity. Based on the idea of the community, 
force against independent states is justified in cases where the security and the normative values 
of the international community are at stake. 
It follows from this, that the idea of an integrated international community is the central 
rationale to conceptualize norms of intervention. Based on the consciousness that all states have 
common needs as they have individual interests, legal doctrines are created which justify the 
interference into the affairs of other international legal entities. Only against this background the 
right – and sometimes even the obligation – to interfere into the sovereignty of another 
international legal actor appears as a necessity. 
Let me illustrate this with representative legal discourses from the late 19th and early 20th 
century. In 1879, the German lawyer Hermann Strauch published a study on the matter of 
intervention which Ellery C. Stowell described later as “probably the most complete and most 
rigidly scientific discussion on intervention in any language.” Stowell concluded that “[f]or 
Strauch intervention is a right of the community of states to prevent any abuse of independence 
which endangers the common security.” (Stowell, 1921: 533) This conclusion was published two 
years after the end of the First World War and the foundation of the League of Nations at the 
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Paris Peace Conference. One could argue that these facts explain Stowell’s enthusiasm about 
Herman Strauch’s community inspired thoughts.  
However, Strauch’s writings indeed represent a widespread perspective in the international 
law literature of that time. Strauch introduced his study not as a new intervention theory but as a 
conclusion of the existing legal literature that takes into account also intervention practices 
(Strauch, 1879: 1). He generally differentiated between intervention rights and intervention 
duties. With regard to the intervention rights, Strauch argued that it is based on the legal 
community of peoples, the “Rechtsgenossenschaft der Völker”. The right of intervention would 
be a necessity for the members of this community and its aim was to abolish any form of threat 
for the common interests (Strauch, 1879: 3–4). 
This argument followed a natural law-logic. Nikolaos Tsagourias concluded with regard to 
the history of humanitarian intervention, “[b]ecause humanitarian intervention is prima facie an 
assault on state sovereignty it is legitimized by being integrated into a natural law theory which 
envisages an enveloping human society”. Tsagourias referred to Antoine Rougier’s important 
essay “La théorie de l’intervention d’humanité” (1910), in which Rougier argued that “people 
live in a triple social organisation: national, international and the société humaine regulated by 
the droit human” (Tsagourias, 2000: 14). 
However, even though the droit humain was not confirmed by treaties and state practices, 
these sources reveal the deep conviction of the international lawyers of the 19th century that an 
inseparable part of independent sovereignty was responsibility, namely the responsibility to 
protect not only individual rights of a state, but also the international community and the 
international legal order in general. This aspect was highlighted recently by Luke Glanville who 
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emphasized the similarity of that logic to the concept of a responsibility to protect today 
(Glanville, 2011). 
With regard to the question what higher principle may justify a break of the non-
interventions norm, another important commentator on the international law of intervention 
answered: “the interests of humanity” and the “sacred human rights”. This conclusion is 
published in the article on intervention in the Deutsches Staats-Wörterbuch edited by Johann 
Caspar Bluntschli and Karl Brater. In Vol. 5, 1860, Albert F. Berner wrote on the “Intervention 
(völkerrechtliche)”. Legal historian commentators emphasize the broad bibliographical basis of 
this encyclopedia entry and therefore underline the significance of this synthesis for the 
intervention literature in the 19th century (Vec, 2010: 136).  
Berner explicitly stressed the general principle of non-intervention (Stowell, 1921: 472) as 
well as the lack of a common state practice of intervention but he also presented exceptions from 
this rule (Berner, 1860: 350). Beside legitimate reason of states to intervene in another state 
when their own rights and interest had been infringed – a case Berner actually did not consider as 
intervention but as war in the classical sense – he mentioned that violations of humanitarian 
interests and in particular human rights would justify international intervention. Furthermore, 
Berner argued that interventions are legitimate if their aim is to protect the status quo of the 
European state system (Berner, 1860: 353). Even though the stability of the European system 
formulates the value of community just as a regional value – in a way that is quite typical for in 
particular German international lawyers in the 19th century (Fisch, 1992) – it fits into the above 
depicted heuristic that first a sense of community has to established before a right is to be 
invoked.  
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The pattern of an international intervention law that is based on a solidary international state 
system is confirmed also by other authors with reference to other sources of the 19th century 
international legal theory (Knudsen, 2009; Koskenniemi, 2001: 341). The degrees of 
commitment to the international community might vary, yet it is always a higher sense of 
community on which intervention laws are based. However, it is necessary to deepen the 
perspective in regard to the origins of this higher principle, the idea of community, in the 19th 
century since most of the research on intervention fails to do so. Most of them do not go into 
detail, though. They do not talk about where that principle of an “idea of community” originated 
from in the 19th century.  
So what is the origin of the idea of community to which all those authors refer to justify the 
international law of intervention? At first glance, we find semantics of the community 
throughout the intellectual history of international law and beyond (Stichweh, 2004). For the 
history of international law in the 19th century, however, one contribution is of significant 
importance. 
In 1860, Robert von Mohl published his essay on the “Die Pflege der internationalen 
Gemeinschaft als Aufgabe des Völkerrechts” (Mohl, 1860). The treatise built on a debate which 
was introduced earlier by Bulmerinq, von Gagern and Kaltenborn von Stauchau and was 
attributed to the scientification and professionalization of the international law discipline (Mohl, 
1860: 579).  Thus, it was a contribution to a debate of German writers, which, however, was 
deeply influential even beyond the German speaking world (Koskenniemi, 2010).  
Robert von Mohl presented his argument on the international community explicitly as a legal 
concept, based on legal reasoning (Mohl, 1860: 586). Two principles are at the center of his 
international legal theory: Firstly, the independent sovereignty of states; and secondly, the 
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international community. According to Mohl, the principle of sovereignty would constitute just 
one step in the evolution of international law while the formation of the international community 
would be its final purpose (Mohl, 1860: 585-586). By this argument, Mohl exceeded the 
predominant positivist rationale of 19th century international law.  In fact, he embedded the 
universal idea of international community, which was already discussed in the natural law 
tradition (one just has to think of Kant), within the recent methodological discussion in positivist 
international legal theory. Firstly, he qualified the status of sovereignty, and secondly, he 
accepted a philosophical reason as rationale for the formation of legal normativity. 
This section showed that the international law of intervention in the 19th and early 20th 
century was based on the idea of international community. Taking the collective needs of the 
community as a vantage point, the right to intervene was presented as a necessity of the 
international legal system. This necessity had the potential to overrule individual interests of 
sovereign actors within the international system. Thus, the semantics of community in the 
international legal literature of intervention suggest an international normative integration that 
goes beyond an image of international legal relations in the 19th and early 20th century which 
usually conceive international law as a positivist system that is based on the principle of 
independent westphalian sovereignty only. Though the findings in the semantic analysis of small 
number of theoretical texts cannot claim to be representative in an empirical sense, it means an 
important explorative input for further comparative studies on the nature of intervention laws and 
the normative integration of the world society. 
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Law, force and justification -The legalization of effective power 
       I turn now to the question whether the idea of community in the international legal literature 
was merely a normative symbol or even an enforceable international law. I showed in the 
preceding section that the idea of the international community was the foundation of 
international intervention law. However, did this law also provide instruments and mechanisms 
to enforce interventionist rights? This is an important question in the international legal context 
since international laws, though binding in principle, were not subject to central enforcement 
institutions. Therefore, to understand the international ordering process as a whole, one has to 
ask under what conditions and by which means international norms were enforced. This is not 
only a question of practice of international law. In this section I focus on the conceptualization of 
law enforcement in the international legal literature on intervention. In the following I show that 
the international law of intervention was characterized by effective enforcement institutions and 
thus was not a law without force. 
To unfold this point, I start, again, with the question of social integration. Talcott Parsons 
remarked in the 1960s that the consciousness of collectivity alone does not form an integrated 
society. He emphasized the importance of an ordering normative frame as “core of the society, as 
a system, [...]” (Parsons, 1966: 10).  World society theorists’ pointed out, that Parsons had doubts 
whether the international system in the 1960s fulfilled the conditions to be qualified as a “world 
society”. According to Parsons, the international system would lack a binding normative 
structure since the international legal system would not provide effective institutions to enforce 
the international law (Greve and Heintz, 2005: 94).  
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This observation by Parsons is analogue to the classical criticisms of international law 
pessimists (“Völkerrechtsleugner”) who are constant companions of international legal 
developments throughout the history of international law (Walz, 1930). The main argument of 
international law pessimists is that, based on the observation of international law's lack of 
centrality, the status of international law as a legal order is contested. However, throughout the 
history of international law this has been invalidated by at least two argumentative strategies: 
Firstly, pleas that stress the fact that international law was followed by its addressees 
empirically – “almost all of the time” (Henkin, 1979: 47). Henkin's famous phrase is usually 
used to point out that the international legal order, though weak in terms of central force, after all 
fulfilled its general function as a legal order which is to guarantee the reliability of expectations 
(Luhmann, 1993: 132). However, it was up to sociolegal researchers to explain this empirical 
observation. In this context, constructivist and rationalist theories of international relations 
became predominant (for an overview see Brunnée, 2006).  
Secondly, approaches which argue that international law does not entirely lack 
institutionalized forms of enforcement (Grosch, 1912). In this context, the international law of 
intervention is highly relevant. In the following I will refer to this latter strategy, the 
conceptualization of force to enact and protect the international community as part of the 
international legal system, to show that the idea of community exceeded the purely semantic 
realm. 
The focus is on collective forms of force since bi-lateral self-help can be understood, as 
Albert F. Berner pointed out above, as war rather than intervention in the name of the 
community. Furthermore, I shall leave aside issues of invited intervention for these form another 
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special case, which is not of relevance for the question of independence and solidarity which lies 
at the core of this article. Instead I focus on what Herman Strauch has described as the “classical 
case of intervention”: The intervention to save the common security that is performed by a 
coalition of states and/or organizations. This is the case of intervention which bears the problem 
of justification in regard to the principle of sovereignty. 
Above, I set out that international laws of intervention aimed at preventing or healing 
violations of international laws, conventions, and expectations which protect the international 
community. In this context forms of collective intervention are of critical importance; not least 
because of the symbolic dimension. The international law of intervention shows that 
international law in its history was not only a self-help system but also produced mechanism of 
collective intervention. Thus, comments which argue that “historically, enforcement of 
international law was bilateral” (Brunnée, 2006: 3) have a weak empirical basis. The 
international law of intervention was not a self-help system alone but also produced mechanism 
of collective force. 
Friedrich Heinrich Geffcken argued in his 1887 treatise on “The Right of Intervention” that 
in case international law is violated every state has the right to use force to enact international 
legal norms (Geffcken, 1887: 6–7). Geffcken continued with outlining the risk of arbitrary uses 
of these rights by single and powerful states. He also discussed the question when a reason for an 
intervention has ceased to exist, in other words when a threat to the community and international 
law has been fathered. In this context, Geffcken argued that the best mechanism to ensure the 
commensuration of intervention measures is the collective intervention of several powers that 
monitor each other (Geffcken, 1887: 5–6). 
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All this shows that the international community was not merely an abstract philosophical 
goal, a symbol of some progressive international legal thinkers, but rather was empowered by 
instruments of collective intervention which were anchored in the international legal system. 
Thus, the international law of intervention, and with it the idea of community, went beyond the 
semantic stage. It formed a field were even force is legitimized to protect the interests of the 
community and the international legal system. This also means that international law in fact does 
provide effective enforcement mechanisms which have to be taken into account when discussing 
the legal character of the international legal system. 
However, the field of intervention law is even more complex. International interventions can 
be legally justified even if a right to intervene is not acknowledged. This paradox is a key 
characteristic of the international law of intervention. Lassa Oppenheim, the author of one of the 
most influential international law treatises of the beginning 20th century, distinguished 
summarized that there is a general distinction of two kinds of legitimate interventions. The one 
being interventions by right and the other one being interventions which are not rightful but 
admissible. Admissible interventions are, beside interventions for self-preservation, those to 
protect the balance of power and those in the interest of humanity. Those interventions are not 
interventions by right, which means that a state has no duty to suffer the intervention without 
self-defense. However, since they are based on legitimate reasons, there are excusable 
(Oppenheim, 2005: 277ff). 
Interventions to protect the Balance of Power occurred in the 19th century for example in the 
context of international financial relations (Heimbeck, 2011). Even though the Balance of Power 
was not acknowledged as a legal principle (Vec, 2011) its importance for the common order 
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served as a justification for collective intervention (Oppenheim, 2005: 229). The intervention in 
the interest of humanitarian grounds was frequently discussed as well. Lassa Oppenheim 
imagined a right of intervention in the name of humanity for the future, under the condition that 
they were exercised in the form of collective intervention (Oppenheim, 2005: 229). 
Oppenheim based his perspective mainly on the influential chapters on intervention by 
William E. Hall, who, though generally seeing legitimate cases for intervention, was reluctant to 
confirm a legal right of humanitarian intervention. However, even Hall argued in the 1880s that 
interventions against immoral acts are justified “when authorized […] by the whole body of 
civilized states accustomed to act together for common purposes” (Hall, 1880: 247). This is also 
confirmed in Henry Wheaton’s famous “Elements of international law” which discusses several 
historical cases of intervention, inter alia those of a coalition of powers in the name of humanity 
(Wheaton, 1836: 125). 
With regard to the justification of international interventions some authors go even further. 
According to them interventions are not justified by the underlying motivation (moral, political, 
economical) alone, but also by outcome. Several commentators of the early 20th century 
highlight that international interventions are simply justified by success (Vincent, 1974: 282; 
Winfield, 1924: 150). But what is the conceptual reason behind justifications by success which 
makes an international intervention legally legitimate? Martti Koskenniemi showed that Carl 
Schmitt presented an argument according to which successful interventions are an “act of 
effective power and therefore law” and as such “even a kind of constitutional act” (Koskenniemi, 
2001: 480; Schmitt, 1995: 605). Schmitt draws this argument obviously from his “Concept of the 
Political” in which any legal act in the end is based on a political decision (Schmitt, 2007). 
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As we saw, the enforcement and justification of the international law of intervention showed 
that the idea of community transcends the semantic sphere. In the contrary, it was provided with 
force as long as force was used on legitimate reasons. Thus, this legalization of international 
power seems to suggest speaking of a constitutional development beyond the national frame. 
However, this legalization of force and power opened the field for misuses of interventionist 
rights. The idea of community was a central narrative of justification of asymmetric international 
relations, dominance and violence in the 19th century and today. So does this fit to the 
observation of international constitutionalism found by Schmitt and emphasized by Martti 
Koskenniemi? 
Sociolegal researchers emphasize a “Constitutionalism in World Society” with regard to the 
“post-national” (Habermas) society (Brunkhorst, 2010; Zumbansen, 2012). However, if we 
understand the notion of constitution in its historical genesis, the aspect of the legalization of 
political power is not enough to qualify a certain state as constitutional. Dieter Grimm argued 
that this “existed long before the constitution emerged” (Grimm, 2010: 5). The main 
“achievement” of the constitution, said Grimm with a reference on Luhmann, was that “it rules 
out any absolute or arbitrary power of men over men” (Grimm, 2010: 10). 
Taking this historical understanding of constitution as a vantage point, leads to the 
conclusion that the international law of intervention has constitutional characteristics, namely the 
legalization of power in the name of a community, but since it is not ruled out in way that avoids 
arbitrary use of it, the usage of the term should be further reflected. Grimm concluded that 
constitution “can not be reconstructed on the international level”, and this has to be discussed 
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further (Grimm, 2010: 3). The analytical setting of this paper is, however, too narrow to address 
this issue adequately. 
 
Conclusion 
I conclude by briefly discussing the main theoretical results and their potential implications for 
future research. 
The paper set out the idea of an international community as the basis of a right of 
intervention in the international legal literature of the late 19th and early 20th century. 
Furthermore, it showed that these rights were enacted by effective enforcement institutions. 
These enforcement institutions of collective action represent a form of legalized international 
power which entails constitutional characteristics. Thus, the paper suggests that the degree of 
international normative integration is deeper than international law pessimists have believed 
throughout the intellectual history of international law. To what extend this had an influence on 
state actors and the practice of international law, of course has to be investigated in further 
studies. However, the paper suggests that in particular the idea of community and its legal 
enactment is not a post-World War II phenomenon but has its roots, in international legal theory, 
in the beginning of the 19th century. However, this system of legalized international power was 
always vulnerable to abuse. In an environment of asymmetric international relations it was an 
instrument to strengthen the dominance of particular international actors. 
Generally, it is striking how this pattern looks like the situation we face today; the recent 
European debt crisis with the international intervention in Greece or the military interventions in 
Middle Eastern countries. Even though the principle of independent sovereignty is highlighted in 
all these cases, the global and regional communities insist on their right to intervene to secure the 
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common interest. Motivations are humanitarian, economical, and political and justifications are 
laid out by right or by success. Thus, for the analysis of recent interventionist practices it is 
necessary to take into account that international interventions have a long history. Their 
theoretical context is broader than just the case of humanitarian intervention. Concepts, like the 
independent sovereignty of nation states have to be understood in the context of their historical 
genesis to see that the “responsibility to protect” for example was understood as an inseparable 
part of this sovereignty. 
A further step in the study of the normative integration in the world society is to deepen the 
research with regard to the constitutional character of inter- and transnational legal regimes. The 
legalization of political power has to be accompanied by mechanisms that help restrain arbitrary 
usages of this power. This is the point where the international law of intervention failed 
empirically. In the context of world society theory, the article has identified analytical indicators 
which have the potential to be further developed to a more general model of the question of 
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